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1 Introduction
Why should the labor market for older workers be of special interest? The
answer lies with the aging problem with which most advanced economies
are faced. Regardless of the way the pension system is administered, people
must eventually work longer as the duration of human life lengthens. But
this means that the labor market for older workers must work well enough
to absorb this increase in the supply.
One characteristic of European labor markets (as opposed to "Anglo-
Saxon" ones) is that they are heavily regulated. Historically, most of these
regulations arose to protect some archetypal "insider" workers, with little
concern for how they would a¤ect the market for "outsiders". Older workers
were not highly represented among the "insiders", which means that the im-
pact of regulations on their employability had little weight in the design of
those regulations. Furthermore, the problem was aggravated by ill-conceived
attempts to "make room" for younger workers by inducing older workers
to retire earlier, which were due to collide with the increased labor partic-
ipation of the latter required by the aging problem. As a result of those
developments, a culture has arisen where the older workers are assumed to
be unemployable. Accordingly, some specic provisions that made it harder
to re them have been implemented in some countries, like the French "De-
lalande" contribution discussed below.
This paper discusses the specicities of the labor market for older workers
and how it is a¤ected by labor market regulation. I argue that most, but
not all, of the employability problems of older workers are the result of labor
market rigidities. In particular, early retirement, the backward indexation
of unemployment benets on wages, and age-specic layo¤ taxes tend to de-
press the market for older workers. And this is true more generally of any
policy that (i) gives entitlements to workers indexed on their past incomes,
(ii) reduces the expected remaining employment spells of older workers, (iii)
increases non-wage labor costs on older workers but not on substitutable cat-
egories, and (iv) generally increases hiring and training costs. By contrast,
the analysis suggests that uniform increases in employment protection harm
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older workers less than younger ones.
Sections 2 and 3 discuss these issues from a theoretical point of view.
Section 4 compares labor market outcomes for older workers in two countries:
a rigid one (France), and a exible one (the US). It then discusses the role
of rigidities by relating the empirical ndings to the preceding analytical
discussion. Section 5 draws the policy lessons from our exercise.
2 Why is the labor market for older workers
specic?
There are three characteristics of older workers that presumably have an
impact on their labor market.
The most important one is that their remaining career time is small: they
are expected to leave their job and retire fairly soon. This is in contrast to a
younger worker who can be expected to remain with the rm for more than
a decade. As we will see, this obvious fact has profound implications for the
employment of older workers.
The second characteristic is that their productivity is (likely) falling.
While this is plausible it is not obvious, but has been documented by a
number of studies. In particular, Kotliko¤ and Ghokale (1992) estimate an
age-productivity prole for various categories of workers by disentangling a
workers wage from his marginal productivity the idea is that deferred pay-
ments for incentive reasons create such a wedge. In such a world, a workers
marginal productivity prole over time is di¤erent from his wage prole. The
former can nevertheless be estimated by using the fact that under compe-
tition, no net prots should be generated by hiring an additional worker.
Hence, the present discounted value of the workers marginal product should
be equal to that of his wages, and Kotliko¤ nds that under some condi-
tions this can be used to recover the age-productivity prole. His results are
striking. They imply that for most categories of workers, productivity peaks
at around age 45, then falls to levels that are estimated to a third of that
peak at age 65. Since it is typically found that compensation rises with age
throughout the life cycle, these ndings imply that relative to their productiv-
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ity, older workers are "overpaid", while they were "underpaid" during their
prime age. This nding is consistent with the theoretical literature which
argues that rms use deferred compensation as an incentive device (Lazear,
1990). Other studies (surveyed in e.g. Skirbekk (2003)) rely on direct mea-
suring of how ability evolves with age. They conrm the ndings of Kotliko¤
and Ghokale, although by design they cannot express them as a monetary
equivalent. Figure 1, taken from Avolio and Waldman (1994), shows how
di¤erent measures of ability evolve with age. They all peak around 20-25,
suggesting that if productivity increases from 25 to 45, it is due to experience
rather than ability.
Third, relative to younger workers, older workers have a human capital
which is more specic to their current job/rm, and less general, i.e. less
transferable to other rms and other sectors. This is because they have
spent a greater fraction of their life acquiring those specic skills through
learning-by doing relative to acquiring more general ones in the educational
system. Empirically, one way to measure that e¤ect is to look at the wage
loss of displaced workers in their future jobs, which should be greater, the
greater the specic component of their human capital in the job they lost.
Indeed, existing studies (Ruhm (1991), Jacobson et al (1993) Cohen et al
(1997) Rosolia and Saint-Paul (1998)) often nd a large loss for older workers.
However, such a loss may also reect greater rents rather than greater specic
skills, especially in light of the above argument that deferred compensation
generates such rents for older workers for incentive reasons. We return to
that issue in our empirical study below.
These three key characteristics of older workers have a number of impli-
cations for the working of the labor market and especially for how the impact
of labor market institutions, such as those which prevail in Europe, on those
workers. Let us discuss these implications.
If workers were o¤ering their services in a pure spot market, they would
be paid their marginal product at each point in time. We would then observe
wages peaking at around 45 and then falling to reach possibly much lower
levels toward the end of ones career. However, as pointed above, this is not
what we see, since wages go up with age. If we assume that this discrepancy is
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due to incentive problems, we see that older workers who lose their job lose an
important rent. That is, while deferred payments are not directly allocative
at the level of the rm/worker pair (the timing of payments is disconnected
from that of the workers marginal product), they are not neutral when one
considers mobility to another position, which is more costly and therefore
more deterred, the greater the workers wage relative to his productivity
and therefore the greater his age.
This is compounded by the loss of specic human capital, and also by
a third e¤ect, which is that given the short expected tenure in any position
that they will nd, there is little room for engaging in deferred compensation.
In some sense, that is fortunate, because it makes it less likely that the
employer lowers the wage upon hiring to increase it later. At the same
time, it also means that the older workers are more likely to end up in jobs
where incentive problems are less important. This is true not only because
deferred compensation is more di¢ cult but more generally because it is more
di¢ cult to use pay to elicit incentives for workers with short expected tenure1.
Overall, this means that older workers, unless they are still employed at a
"lifelong" position, are more likely to be employed in the "secondary" sector
of jobs that are easily monitored and thus typically involve less autonomy
and responsibility, and also lower wages2.
A second implication is that unemployment benets are likely to be more
damaging to the employment rate of older workers that to that of younger
workers. Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998) have analysed the consequences for
aggregate unemployment of the fact that unemployment benets are indexed
backward on wages. This backward indexation implies that the unemployed
will be especially picky if the distribution of job o¤ers is associated with lower
wages than the preceding one. They show that at times of "turbulence", i.e.
intense sectoral reallocation, job losses are associated with losses of rm- and
sector-specic human capital, so that the wages that the unemployed can get
in the new sector of the economy, where they are yet to learn the trade, are
1This is a general prediction of the "shirking" model of e¢ ciency wages (see Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984)).
2See Saint-Paul (1996).
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low compared to their previous ones, and therefore low compared to their
unemployent benets. This is why "turbulence" has a large adverse impact on
unemployment in countries with generous, backward-indexed, unemployment
benets; on the other hand, the e¤ect is much smaller in countries where
such benets are not generous. Their argument is especially salient for the
older workers. Our discussion above implies that even in the absence of
"turbulence", the wages they can claim after having lost a job are likely to
be substantially smaller, because of the deferred compensation e¤ect, the
loss of specic human capital e¤ect, and the greater likelihood of working in
the secondary sector. Furthermore, as their productivity falls with age, the
wedge between their reservation wage as determined by their benet level
and the o¤ers they get is likely to grow. Thus we not only expect a lower
exit rate from unemployment, but also a stronger "duration dependence" 
the phenomenon by which exit rates from unemployment tend to fall with
the length of the unemployment spell3. We will refer below to this e¤ect
 the fact that unemployment benets push the resevration wage of older
workers up relative to the wages they can expect on their future o¤ers as
the entitlement e¤ect.
Third, hiring and ring costs will a¤ect the employability of older work-
ers di¤erently from younger workers. This is an important question because
a large fraction of those costs are regulatory  especially the ring costs
that are created by employent protection legislation. Furthemore, employ-
ment protection is paid special attention in the debate over the market for
older workers. Some countries (e.g. France, as discussed below) have spe-
cial provisions that increase employment protection beyond a certain age.
Furthermore, in most cases entitlements are increasing with tenure, which
automatically benets older workers.
If we rst consider ring costs, we see that their deterrent e¤ect on em-
ployability is lower for older workers. The reason is that, should the rm
consider laying o¤ the worker, it can wait for his retirement instead of pay-
ing the ring cost. That value of waiting is obviously much higher if the
3Unfortunately, my own attempts to nd such a statistically signicant e¤ect in the
French case failed.
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worker is young. So, somewhat paradoxically, a ring cost that would be im-
posed uniformly on all workers would make older workers more employable
relative to the younger ones.
Of course, the story is entirely di¤erent if ring costs go up with age. In-
deed, most European countries have employment protection legislations that
become more stringent as the tenure of the worker increases. This is likely
to be correlated with age. Furthermore, a number of countries impose addi-
tional taxes on layo¤s for older workers. A notable provision, for example, is
the French so-called "Delalande " contribution, which imposes an additional
ring tax on workers who are older than 50. Following standard economics,
we expect such a tax to reduce both the hiring rates and the ring rates of
this category of workers. Furthermore, it is also likely that the expectation
of the tax will reduce the hiring rate for workers younger than 50, and is also
likely to increase their layo¤ rate as rms may want to anticipate on a future
layo¤ decision concerning those workers to avoid paying the additional tax.
Behagel et al. (2008) use changes in the Delalande tax to estimate its e¤ect
on the hiring rate of older workers.
In particular, in 1992 the system was changed so as to exempt rms from
paying the tax whenever workers were older than 50 at the time they were
hired. Clearly, this was meant to o¤set the negative e¤ects of the tax upon
hiring; but at the same time it meant that those hired after 50 lacked the
extra protection of the others. This would imply that workers hired after 50
would be laid o¤ before workers of the same age hired prior to that age, thus
reinforcing the dual nature of the labor market. In any case, the estimates of
Behagel et al based on that natural experiment conrm the presumption that
imposing extra protection on a selected group of workers has a substantial
negative impact on their hiring rate. They nd that the reform increased
the job nding rate of the 50+ group, relative to younger workers, by 0.5
percentage points on a monthly basis. This is a large e¤ect. For example,
with a monthly job loss rate of 0.1 % and job nding rate of 1.5 %, we get
an unemployment rate in steady state equal to 0.1/1.6 = 6.25 %. If we now
reduce the monthly job nding rate by 0.5 %, the unemployment rate jumps
to 10 %. The e¤ect is a compound of "direct" e¤ects the return from hiring
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somebody is lower if there are greater ring costs and substitution e¤ects
I prefer the low ring cost applicant the high one. While it is di¢ cult to
disentangle the two kinds of e¤ects, the authorsresults suggest that strong
substitution is at work: the reform not only reduced the gap in hiring rate
between th 50- and the 50+ age groups, it inverted its sign: after the reform,
it was easier to nd a job for a worker aged 51 than a worker aged 49.
Finally, the authors are also able to estimate the e¤ect of the Delalande
tax on layo¤s; they nd that it reduces the layo¤ rate. They also nd a
slight positive e¤ect on the layo¤ rate before age 50 butit is very small and
statistically insignicant.
Turning now to hiring costs, we see that they have a stronger e¤ect on a
workers employability, the older that worker. This is because the hiring cost
is less damaging to the rm, the longer the duration of the job over which
the rm can recoup it. Clearly, that duration is lower for older workers.
Thus a uniform hiring costs reduced the demand for older workers relative
to younger ones. The lower expected duration of the job reduces the total
(discounted) value to the rm of employing the worker: this is what we will
call the endgame e¤ect. As a result the rm is willing to pay less to employ
the worker, implying that older workers are going to nd jobs in sectors where
training and recruitment costs are low. Below, I will document the endgame
e¤ect both in the context of a small theoretical model and of an empirical
comparison between France and the United States. This is in accordance
with the rest of the literature. For example, in a recent paper, Hairault et
al. (2008) capture the e¤ects of hiring costs in a search-matching model, and
they document a positive relationship between the age of retirement and the
employment rate of older workers. This positive relationship is depicted on
Figure 2. They supplement this with econometric evidence by constructing a
worker-specic variable which measures the distance to retirement and show
that this variable has a positive e¤ect on the probability of being employed
in a French data set, controlling for the usual variables.
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3 Lessons from a simple model
While some of the aspects discussed above are easy to grasp, a formal model
may be useful in order to understand the interplay between hiring and ring
costs and the endgame e¤ect. In this section, I consider such a model.
Assume time is continuous and that the duration of human life is T:When
hired, workers are in a high productivity state and produce a ow of output
y = yH : Let s denote the workers age. With probability p(s) per unit of time,
the workers falls into a low productivity state such that y = yL < yH : The
worker remains in that state until he leaves the job or retires. In principle
p(s) can vary with age, and could reect the hump-shaped dependence of
productivity with respect to age documented by Kotliko¤ and Ghokale and
others. Wages are xed and equal to w: To hire a worker a rm must pay a
hiring cost H: Furthermore, a ring cost F must be paid and we allow it to
be time-dependent. More specically, the ring cost is assumed to be equal
to F0 for s < s and F1  F0 for s  s: If F1 = F0 we are in the special case
of a ring cost which is independent of age.
Firms maximize the present discounted value of prots, under a constant
real interest rate equal to r: They have workers of di¤erent ages arriving
randomly, and for each worker decide whether or not to hire him. Clearly
given the constant returns to scale implicit in our assumptions regarding the
process for productivity, all these hiring decisions are independent from one
another.
We want to characterize the hiring and dismissal decisions of rms de-
pending on the age of the worker. For the problem to be interesting, it must
be that
yL < w < yH :
Otherwise, one would either not hire anybody or not re anybody. Let us
then assume that this inequality holds. We rst characterize the dismissal
decision. For a worker of age s > s such that y = yL; the rm can keep him
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until retirement which yields a (negative) present discounted prot equal to
K(s) =
Z T
s
(yL   w)e r(t s)dy
=
yL   w
r
 
1  e r(T s) : (1)
On the other hand, the rm can get rid of the worker right away, which
involves an immediate cost equal to F1 and thus a net prot equal to
F (s) =  F1:
Thus the rm will keep the worker if and only if
w   yL
r
 
1  e r(T s) < F1:
For a worker in the low state with age s < s; the two options are the
same: keep the worker until retirement and get a prot K(s) given by the
RHS of (1), vs. re the worker right away and have a prot F (s) =  F0:
The intermediary option of keeping the worker to get rid of him immediately
prior to the rise of the ring cost at age s cannot be optimal. It would yield
a net prot equal to
W (s) =
Z s
s
(yL   w)e r(t s)dy   F0e r(s s)
=
yL   w
r
 
1  e r(s s)  F0e r(s s)
=  F0 +

F0 +
yL   w
r
 
1  e r(s s) : (2)
Clearly, for that option to dominate immediate dismissal, we would need
that W (s) >  F0; implying, by virtue of (2), that F0 > w yLr : But since w yLr
is the present discounted value of losses for a low productivity worker that
would stay forever, this latter inequality in turn implies that the rm will be
better-o¤ keeping the worker at age s rather than get rid of him. In short,
if the ow equivalent of losses is greater than the ring cost, then immediate
dismissal is optimal; otherwise, waiting until the worker retires is optimal.
The intermediate option cannot be optimal unless the losses themselves are
time-varying which we have ruled out in our model for simplicity.
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Figure 3 plots the "dismissal" frontier FF in the (s; yL) plane: it gives
the lowest value of yL such that the rm prefers to keep the worker, as a
function of age. It is downard sloping and has a vertical asymptote at s = T
and yL =  1; reecting the fact that rms are more likely to wait, the older
the worker. The step at s = s reects the increase in ring costs when one
passes that age threshold.
The intersection of this frontier with a horizontal line at the actual value
of yL determines a critical age, ~s; after which the worker will not be red if
he falls in the low productivity state. Conversely, all workers younger than
that will be red if they fall in the low productivity state. The critical age
may be larger than, equal to, or smaller than, the regulatory threshold s: It
will be exactly equal to it for a whole range of low productivity levels, due
to the vertical portion of FF at s = s: Tightening employment protection
legislation increasing F0,F1; or both  shifts the dismissal frontier down
and lowers the critical age. This is illustrated on Figure 4.
While the model rules out any "preventive" dismissal in anticipation
of the threshold for low-productivity workers, this may happen for high-
productivity workers. In Appendix 1 I solve for the rms maximum ex-
pected discounted prot in the case where p is constant and in the regime
where ~s > s: It is shown that for F0 small enough and F1 and w large enough
within the parameter zone compatible with this regime, it is indeed optimal
to re high productivity workers immediately before they reach the critical
age s:
The next step is to characterize the hiring decision. To do so, I need
to compute JH(s); the value to the rm of employing a worker of age s in
the high productivity state. This in turn gives us the "employabililty" of a
worker of age s: If it is greater than the hiring cost H; then an applicant of
age s will be hired, otherwise the applicant will be turned down. Therefore,
the greater the value of the worker JH(s); the more the worker is employable.
The variation of JH(s) with s is analysed in the Appendix, and there are
three possibilities:
1. The simplest case is when JH(s) falls with s along the life cycle. This
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is the case depicted on Figure 54. Workers are always less employable when
they get older. Typically, this is more likely to old when p is small, yH is
large, F1 is small, and w   yL is small. Firing costs then do not play a big
role in the rms hiring decisions: one is not very likely to fall into the low
productivity state, the losses made in that state are not very large, the prots
made in the high productivity state are large, and the level of the ring cost
is low. The prole of employability then resembles the one that we would
get in the absence of employment protection; it is decreasing simply because
when the worker is older the rm expects to reap prots from the worker
over a shorter period of time.
2. In the situation shown on Figure 65, employability goes up until it
reaches a maximum age s^; which is greater than ~s; meaning that the most
employable workers are not red when they fall into the low productivity
state. This situation prevails if ring costs are important, thus if p is large,
F1 large, yH small and w yL large, and also if the incremental ring cost for
older workers, F1 F0; is small. In such a situation the possibility of having to
ine¢ ciently retain the worker, or get rid of him and pay the ring tax, should
productivity fall, plays an important role. This gives a premium to older
workers who are not expected to stay long, and this in turn, through forward-
looking expectations, generates an upward-sloping pattern of employability
up to age s^: The process has limits, though, since high productivity workers
who are too old stay too little time in the rm to generate a large NPV: the
value of the job eventually falls to zero as s increases beyond s^:
3. In the situation depicted on Figure 7, employability is M-shaped6.
That is, it falls until one reaches the threshold age s; then goes up until age
s^; and then falls again. This situation prevails in the same circumstances as
the preceding one, except that the gap F1   F0 is now large. This means
that workers get less and less employable when they approach the threshold.
4This gure has been drawn for T = 50; s = 35; w = 1; yH = 2; yL = 0:5; F0 = 0:5;
F1 = 1:5; r = 0:05; p = 0:1:
5This gure has been drawn for T = 50; s = 35; w = 0:8; yH = 1:5; yL = 0:5; F0 = 2:8;
F1 = 3; r = 0:05; p = 0:1:
6This gure has been drawn for T = 50; s = 35; w = 0:8; yH = 1:5; yL = 0:5; F0 = 0:5;
F1 = 3; r = 0:05; p = 0:1:
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However, after that, age is again a positive factor since it reduces the likeli-
hood of having to pay the ring cost. But this is again eventually defeated
by the vanishing of the individuals remaining professional life.
Finally, it is also useful to compare the prole of employability for di¤erent
levels of employment protection. This is what is done on Figure 8, where
three situations are compared: a "exible" one with no ring cost, a "rigid"
one with a uniform ring cost equal to 150 % of the annual wage, and an
asymetrical one with a ring cost equal to 100 % of the wage before s = 35
and to 200 % of the wage therafter. The graph conrms that rigidities
reduce employability mostly for young and prime-age workers rather than
older workers, and that the step reduces employability, relative to a uniform
system, ahead of the date the step takes place (by some ve years in this
simulation).
4 How do older workers fare in a exible vs.
a rigid labor market? An empirical com-
parison between France and the US.
In this section I perform an empirical comparison of the relative employability
of older workers in a "exible" labor market (the United States) and a "rigid"
one (France). To keep the discussion short, I only consider those dimensions
where the two countries are signicantly di¤erent. However, a complete set
of graphs and tables is available in the working paper version of this article.
4.1 Employment rates: the endgame e¤ect
The rst variable I look at is the employment rate. This variable reects
both labor supply and labor demand, and therefore captures di¤erent forces
from indicators like unemployment or unemployment duration, which tell us
something about the functioning of the labor market. An employment rate
can be low either because unemployment is high or because labor supply is
low, and the latter can be low either because of distortions or because of
taxes. On the other hand, it is often argued that the incentives to register
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as unemployed are low if unemployment benets are not generous enough,
which blurs the distinction between being unemployed vs. out of the labor
force. We cannot solve these issues here but we can look at both indicators.
Cohen et al. (1997) have shown that for su¢ ciently narrowly dened (by
sex and education) cells, employment rates are paradoxically slightly higher
in France than in the US for prime-age workers. Thus, most of the lower
performance of France overall comes from (i) non prime-age workers (ii) the
composition e¤ect due to lower educational levels in France. More recent
data from the 2005 US CPS and the 2005 French labor force survey conrms
those ndigs: employment rates are marginally higher in France for prime-
aged men. But for older workers, the picture is reversed. While employment
rates are understandably much lower in the 60-65 age range since the o¢ cial
retirement age in France is 60 they are also lower in the 55-60 range7. This
is reported in Table 1: employment rates for those catgories of workers are all
lower in France than in the US 1, and the categories where the older workers
are least employed in France relative to the US, are low and medium-skilled
men.
To have some clue about how to interpret these ndings, we can refer
to the model above. It implies that employability falls sharply as one nears
retirement age (see for example gure 8). Thus the lower employability of
the 56-60 age group in France compared to the US is probably due to the
earlier retirement age in France. When that age was brought down to 60 the
e¤ect on employment for people immediately below that age was not taken
into accountthese numbers suggest it is substantial. We have also seen that
employment protection legislation runs in the opposite direction, by making
the older workers relatively more employable. Thus the numbers suggest that
this e¤ect is not strong enough to o¤set the endgame e¤ect.
7For women, the picture is more complex. For high-school drop-outs, employment
rates are substantially higher in France, implying that even the 55-60 range has a higher
employment rate than its Us counterpart. The same is true for college graduates, but that
is now due to the fact that employment rates are virtually identical across all actegories,
except of course the 60-65 age range. For high school graduates and college dropouts, the
pattern is the same as for men: higher employment rates for prime-age workers in France,
but much lower ones for the 55-60 range.
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4.2 Unemployment: the mid-life discount
We now turn to unemployment rates (Table 2). These gures are fairly
low for older workers; for workers older than 60 in France, very few are
actively looking for a job and unemployment rates (not reported) are very
low. The most striking feature here is associated with mature rather than
older workers: There is a sharp rise in unemployment rate for men with at
least a high school degree in France during their forties. We will refer to this
as the mid-life discount. This phenomenon does not take place in the United
States. It is most salient for the intermediate skills group, kicking in at 41
for high school graduates and 46 for workers with some college. It is milder
and chiey limited to the 41-46 age group for college graduates and virtually
non-existent for high school drop outs.
Since the midlife discount occurs in France and not in the US, it is natural
to assume that it is due to labor market rigidities. While institutions such as
the increase in employment protection with tenure and the existence of a step
at a certain age may play a role, a bigger role can presumably be ascribed
to the entitlement e¤ect, as we have discussed above. At 45 workers enjoy
their peak productivity, which includes a great deal of job-specic human
capital, and in addition derive large rents from deferred compensation. Thus
the entitlement e¤ect is likely to be large for this group. This hypothesis
is somewhat conrmed by the fact that the phenomenon is absent for high-
school dropouts. They are more likely to work in easily monitored routine or
non cognitive tasks, which reduces the role for incentive payment schemes,
including deferred compensation. And the scope for learning by doing in
those jobs is lower, which suggests a atter evolution of productivity during
ones career. Therefore, at mid-life these workerswages are likely to be
less di¤erent from their marginal product (in both their current and future
jobs) than for other workers, which makes the entitlement e¤ect of backward
indexation of unemployment benets less salient.
Interestingly, the mid-life discount does not seem to a¤ect women. In-
stead. they experience abnormally high unemployment rate in France com-
pared to the US during their fertile years, between 25 and 45. This is presum-
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ably the result of generous provisions for maternity leave in France, which
reduces the demand for women in those ages. The e¤ect may be so strong
as to dwarf the mid-life discount. But the mid-life discount is also likely to
be smaller for women on average, since they are both less likely to engage
in continuous careers (thus acquiring less specic human capital) and more
likely to work in the "secondary" sector.
4.3 Labor market transitions
The preceding data gives us a static picture of the labor market. We also
want to know how the older workers fare in a dynamic sense. For this we
compare the transition rates between France and the US.
A stylised representation of these two economies holds that because of
rigidities, both the job loss and the job nding rates are lower in France than
in the US. This is indeed what the earlier literature found, e.g. Cohen et al.
However it also found that some groups, like the young, were used as a bu¤er
of exibility and that their job loss rates, in particular, were more similar to
the US. We want to know if this stylized vision holds for more recent data,
and in particular how the older workers fare: are they used in a "exible" or
in a "rigid" way.
One issue is that labor market ows are quite sensitive to the business
cycle. And the business cycle was not the same in 2005 in France and the
US. While unemployment was falling in the US, it was still rising in France;
it started to fall in 2006. Therefore, we perform the comparison of transition
rates for two more similar years, keeping 2005 for France but using 2002 for
the United States.
I rst discuss aggregate transition rates by age and then disaggegate them
by sex and education.
I start with the job loss rate. In relation to the above discussion about
the measurement of employment and unemployment, there are two ways
to measure it: one can use the ow from employment to unemployment,
or alternatively the ow from employment to non-employment (the sum of
unemployment and non participation). Ideally, the rst one should capture
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involuntary job losses, and the second one adds voluntary ones. In practice,
the distinction is blurred by the high incentives to register as unemployed in
France (even in the case of a voluntary quits), and the low ones in the US.
So I look at both measures.
Figure 9 depicts the employment-to-unemployment ow in both countries.
A striking fact is that this measure of the job loss rate is not larger in the
US. The measures are similar for prime-age, higher in France for the young,
and lower for the older workers. This suggests that older workers, despite
reforms like the 1992 adjustment to the Delalande contribution mentioned
above, rmly remain in the protected sector. In contrast, the young now
have a job loss rate even higher than in the United States. Figure 10 shows
the job loss rate, including the employment-to-nonparticipation ow. The
picture is somewhat more consistent with conventional wisdom: the job loss
rate is higher in the US for prime-age workers; it is similar in both countries
for the young; and it is now higher in France for older workers. This is clearly
due to the ow to non participation, and thereforer mostly captures the role
of retirement and early retirement schemes. This is not surprising, but the
numbers are telling: they suggest that for the 56-60 age groups, who have
not reached the o¢ cial retirement age yet, these schemes account for some
15 % of the relevant workforce retiring each year, as compared to 10 % in
the United States.
I now turn on the job nding rates, that are reported on Figure 11. The
data are striking. Overall, job nding rates are twenty percentage points
greater in the United States than in France, say 50 % vs. 30 % yearly. And
the gap widens as the workers get older, rising to thirty percentage points
for the 51-55 age group, while the job nding rate falls to a very small 5 %
per year for the 56-60 age group in France.
This leads us to reconsider somewhat the existence of the mid-life dis-
count: it does not show up as large unemployment for older workers because
the incidence of unemployment (the employment-unemployment transition
rate) among those workers, is low. But if we look at the duration of unem-
ployment (the inverse of the job nding rate), we nd it is extremely low
for those workers; and we also have seen that the incidence is somewhat
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artically low because of the large rate at which they withdraw from the
workforce.
Both the supply side and the demand side conspire in generating a low
job nding rate for older workers: on the supply side, there is the entitlement
e¤ect. On the demand side, we have the endgame e¤ect. Note however that
if we use the job nding rate of the 60-65 age group in the United States
as a measure of the endgame e¤ect in a exible economy, we do nd that
it exists, however it accounts for say a reduction in job nding rates from
55 % a year to 40 % a year. This is substantial, but not comparable to the
massive collapse in job nding rate experienced by French workers as they
reach 55. The gap is not likely to be explained by the entitlement e¤ect alone:
it is probably as large for the 46-50 group (otherwise the mid-life discount
would not arise), and yet this group has a much higher job nding rate. An
additional factor probably comes from the minimum wage. One could try to
test for this by looking at more disaggregated data, however that is di¢ cult
for the job nding rate since there are very view unemployed workers in many
sex x age cells. But the scant evidence that we have suggests that the job
nding rates are especially low for the older, low skilled workers. Indeed, in
the French labor force survey, the vast majority of the unemployed above
50 are high-school dropouts. For the small number of older unemployed
workers with greater skills, the job nding rates are typically substantially
higher, although there are so few observations that we should be cautious in
drawing any conclusion.
Overall, these data give a picture of a substantial excess protection for
job loss in France for older workers, with the counterpart of extremely low
job nding rates compared to other groups.
4.4 Wages
We now turn to the analysis of wages, starting with the evolution of wages
over the life cycle in both countries.
Figure 12 depicts the time prole of wages, for each educational group,
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in France8. We nd a typical pattern of wages rising with age, and the rate
of increase shows no sign of slowing down. One exception is high school
dropouts, who have a pretty at prole and experience a slight fall toward
the end of their career (consistent with my argument above regarding the
entitlement e¤ect being weaker for those workers).
Figure 13 shows the wage prole for each educational category for the
"exible" US. We see that there is a hump-shaped pattern and that it is
typically more pronounced, the more educated the worker. In fact, for high-
school dropouts, wages are essentially at over time: there seems to be no
human capital accumulation, and no depreciation thereof.
This sharp contrast between the two countries suggest that wage-setting
institutions in France lead to returns to age that are substantially too high
relative to the market outcome: wages should eventually be falling, despite
the tendencies to deferred compensation and human capital accumulation,
and in accordance with the direct evidence on productivity. The fall should
start at around 50 (which is precisely the age where the Delalande contri-
bution kicks in). But in France the increase continues. For example, in the
US, male college graduates aged 61-65 earn 10 % less than those aged 45-
50. In France they earn 33 % more. Taken at face value, this suggests they
are 43 % overpaid. Consequently, one needs a very large incremental ring
cost to o¤set the high incentives of rm to re them, and one would need
a sharp reduction in their unemployment benet replacement ratio to bring
their reservation wage in line with what they could earn in a future job.
4.5 Wage losses
A lot of the discussion above around the e¤ects of unemployment benets
and their retrospective indexation on wages revolves around the existence of
high rents for older workers. We have argued that those rents may originate
in their disproportionate accumulation of job-specic human capital as well
as the use by rms of deferred compensation in order to elicit incentives.
There are other sources of rents as well: They may originate in a collective
8For space reason the data are again conned to men. A similar pattern arises for
women.
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bargaining structure that would impose an age prole for earnings discon-
nected from market forces. Or, it may be that older workers have had more
time to acquire rents, for example by investing in securing a job in the union-
ized sector. In this section I provide some evidence by looking at the wage
losses of displaced workers.
In theory, the rent of a worker should be dened as the (expected) present
discounted value of his income stream under his current job, minus his ex-
pected present discounted value of income should he become unemployed.
Under a competitive labor market, the di¤erence between the two should be
zero. In practice, to measure that we would need to know the details of the
processes governing income both under employment and under unemploy-
ment. While this is not in principle unfeasible, it is replete with problems,
so we use instead the di¤erence between the age earned following an unem-
ployment spell and the wage of similar workers who have not experienced
that spell. This is only an imperfect measure of the rent because it rests on
the wages of those workers who do nd jobs. This tends to reduce the wage
loss as compared to the rent, since wage o¤ers that are below the reservation
wage are rejected, which tends to increase the duration of unemployment,
thus depressing the value of being unemployed. Thus the true rent material-
izes not only in the future wage but also in the duration of unemployment,
and that part which clearly is a¤ected by labor market institutions  is
not reected in our measure of wage loss. Nevertheless, if anything this leads
our measure to under-estimate the rent in the "rigid" (= high unemployment
duration) country compared to the exible (=low unemployment duration)
country. Thus if we nd a substantial wage loss for older workers in the
rigid country, this is an understatement of the problem generated for those
workers by the backward indexation of unemployment benets.
To estimate the e¤ect of age, I estimate an earnings function to which I
add age dummies crossed with a dummy equal to 1 if the worker has expe-
rienced an unemployment spell in the preceding year. Two comments are in
order: First, this approach constrains the estimated wage loss to be the same
across educational categories; this is a drawback but it saves on degrees of
freedom. Second, the estimates may be biased if there is a correlation be-
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tween unobserved ability and the likelihood of losing ones job; to correct
for this the literature has usually limited the analysis to job losses that are
supposedly exogenous to the workersunobserved ability, such as those drven
by plant closing. Here, however, this would substantially reduce the number
of available observations. Note however that my comparison between two
countries remains valid as long as the biases induced by unobserved hetero-
geneity are assumed to be the same; furthermore, the estimates are quite
similar to those of the literature, suggesting the bias is small9.
Table 3 reports the results for men and women. In both France and the
United States, the estimated wage loss is substantial and of the same order of
magnitude as found by the earlier literature. The loss is signicantly higher
in the United States than in France, which is at variance with some of the
earlier ndings10. Finally, the rent seems increasing with age in France, but
in the US it is highest for the 41-50 age group. In a nutshell, Table 3 tells us
that rents (as measured by wage losses) are greater in the US than in France,
and that theyr are hump-shaped with age in the US but increasing with age
in France.
How can we make sense of those results? In both countries, rents are
greater for older workers overall. This is consistent with our discussion above
as both the e¤ect of deferred compensation and that of specic human capital
accumulation tend to generate an upward prole of rents. The di¤erences
between the US and France are more di¢ cult to understand. If only these
two market forces were present, we would expect to get the same results
in the two countries. Rigidities obviously introduce di¤erences between the
two countries, but it is not straightforward to predict their e¤ect11. One
9It should be added that the plant closing approach has problems of its own: To the
extent that wages have a plant specic component (which would be true if wage formation
obeyed some rent-sharing logic), they are likely to be correlated with the likelihood of plant
closing. And such a correlation will also arise if workers of similar unobservable ability tend
to work in the same plants, as the theory of assignment predicts under complementarity
between worker quality.
10Notably, Cohen et al. (1997).
11Note that the theoretical prediction regarding the comparison of wage losses between
rigid and exible countries is ambiguous. On the one hand, greater generosity of unem-
ployment benets pushed the reservation wage up: this tends to reduce the wage loss from
displacement, and at the same time to lengthen the duration of the unemployment spell.
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interpretation is that in the US, where wages are more inuenced by market
forces and wage inequality is greater, the return to specic human capital is
greater, implying greater e¤ects on wages when such human capital is lost
or depreciated12. At the same time, collective bargaining in France forces an
upward prole of rents with age. On net, this generates greater rents in the
US except for the age category where the latter e¤ect is stronger, i.e. the
older workers.
5 Conclusion and policy perspectives
Above I have argued that a number of features of European labor market
institutions are particularly harmful for the elderly. This brings the key
question: how should policy handle these issues?
A tempting answer would be to increase employment protection for the
elderly, which has indeed often been done. Why is that tempting? Because
the endgame e¤ect is a fundamental characteristic of the labor market for the
elderly. One can reduce its strength by eliminating regulatory components of
hiring costs  whatever the justication for such costs, the existence of the
endgame e¤ect tells us that they particularly harm older workers and suggests
such regulations should be alleviated for them. But the bulk of hiring costs
are intrinsic and not generated by regulation. Thus it is tempting to say that
no deregulation of hiring costs will work and that the only thing one can do
is to have higher employment protection for older workers.
Yet this is far from satisfactory, for at least three reasons. First, we have
seen above that there are reasons to believe that di¤erential employment pro-
tection provisions generate strong substitutions e¤ects. Second, this would
On the other hand (this would be apparent from a dynamic search model), the probability
of nding a job is lower in a rigid country, which makes it more costly for the worker to
turn down an o¤er; this pushes the reservation wage down. Some simulations reported in
Saint-Paul (2000) suggest that the two e¤ects could easly cancel each other, delivering a
similar wage discount in a exible and a rigid country.
12Note that the hump-shaped pattern of wage losses in the US mimicks that of wages.
This is consistent with our interpretation provided that (i) a substantial fraction of the
evolution of wages over the life cycle is accounted for by specic human capital, and (ii)
a substantial fraction of that specic human capital is lost when the worker loses is job
and/or during the subsequent unemployment spell.
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lead to locking older workers in their jobs for a long time, which is probably
udesirable from the viewpoint of allocative e¢ ciency. Third, no matter how
high employment protection is, there will always be a mass of unemployed
older workers, if anything because their employer went bankrupt or because
they had to resign due to some adverse personal shock such as having to
move. Clearly, these would be particularly harmed by di¤erential ring costs
for older workers. This is indeed the rationale for the waiving of the Dela-
lande contribution for workers hired after 50 discussed above, but it begs the
question of how to handle the endgame e¤ect.
To resolve this tension, it is useful to start recognizing that the endgame
e¤ect is genuine in that it is simply socially ine¢ cient to pay high hiring
costs for a worker who will retire four years after being hired. This should
rule out policies that subsidize the hiring of older workers; if older workers
have to change jobs, it must be in activities where hiring costs are not too
high.
To get a grasp of how an e¢ cient policy would look like, we may specu-
late on how the labor market for older workers would operate in a world of
perfectly competitive labor markets. In such a world, older workers would
be more likely to stick to their current job because of the endgame prob-
lem. This means that they would have to bear with wage cuts in response
to productivity falling with age and in response to negative shocks to that
productivity. But some of them would nevertheless lose their jobs and they
might either work in sectors with low hiring costs, that are probably not
paying much, or decide to use their accumulated wealth to retire. Thus we
will see (i) declining wages with age, (ii) a susbstantial wage loss upon un-
employment (reecting the devaluation of specic human capital associated
with job loss), (iii) lower job loss rates, (iv) use of personal savings to make
up for wage losses, and nally (v) retirement contingent on having an adverse
labor market shock.
Ironically, we could make the point that, to the extent that the wages of
older workers are "too high" relative to that benchmark in Europe, institu-
tions like additional employment protection and pre-retirement are exactly
what is needed to replicate the competitive outcome in terms of employment
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patterns despite that wages give the wrong signals. However, this admin-
istrative solution does not guarantee that the right people are allocated to
the situations of continuing in their job and retiring, and, more worryingly,
the third tier of older workers those who move to low-productivity jobs 
is eliminated altogether, being pushed into pre-retirement schemes or other
welfare programs.
One way to improve on that would be to move to a system of more
exible wages and less generous unemployment benets (and in particular
reconsider their backward indexation on wages), while introducing a compen-
sation system that allows older workers to supplement their labor income.
An attractive solution is to let them free to choose their retirement age in
an actuarially fair way, while disconnecting entirely the payment of pensions
from labor market participation. Thus, those who see their wage falling at
say 58, could start drawing their pension, either in part or fully, and cu-
mulate it with their labor income. Another approach would be to replace
generous unemployment benets by a "wage insurance" scheme that would
supplement the income of older workers if they have lost their job and end
up in a low-paying job. This would not be of great help to the unemployed,
but evidence from anglo-saxon countries suggests that at low benet lev-
els, unemployment duration is low, so that substantial insurance is derived
from high job nding rate. Furthermore, a system of unemployment sup-
port account could be introduced, which would amount to easing the credit
constraint on the unemployed.
One common worry is that increasing the retirement age does not work,
because older workers have a very low job nding rate and are thus "unem-
ployable". To the extent that this is due to the endgame e¤ect, our analysis
suggests that the mere fact of raising the retirement age will increase the
job nding rate for workers in a given age category. On the other hand,
the endgame e¤ect cannot be eliminated and it will now apply to the older
workers who are at the same distance from retirement; since those are even
less productive, the e¤ect will be even stronger, which reinforces my claim
that cumulating pensions with work must be an important feature of any
workable pension reform.
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Should the employment of the older workers be subsidized, as is the case
in the Netherlands? Euwals et al. (2008), in an extensive discussion of the
Dutch system and its reform prospects, argue that this is probably counter-
productive. In addition to the ethical problems of tax treatments linked to
individual characteristics, in a pure market outcome the employment rate of
older workers would naturally be lower than for prime-age ones. The only dis-
tortion that exacerbates that is the backward-indexed unemployment benet,
but then it makes sense to reconsider the design of unemployment benets.
And there is some contradiction between the attempt to improve the nanc-
ing of public pensions by working longer, and at the same time introducing
another redistributive scheme in favor of the elderly.
The wage insurance system proposed above is not as perversely redistrib-
utive as the Dutch subsidy, especially since it may benet younger work-
ers and older ones alike (but the latter would benet more), and would be
compensated by lower unemployent benets (which would also be better in
budgetary terms). And allowing to cumulate pensions is even simpler and
nancially and distributively neutral  overall, the goals of those systems
is to allow consumption smoothing along the life cycle and across states of
nature, in the face of nancial market imperfections, and that is what unem-
ployment support accounts and actuarially fair access to pensions provide.
Euwals et al. agree with this but seem more cautious about such unemploy-
ment support accounts, based on the view that credit constrains are not so
important in the Netherlands. If this is true, then unemployment support
accounts are of little value, but, a shown by Hassler and Rodriguez-Mora
(1998), so is unemployment insurance: given the relatively low duration of
unemployment spells in a exible labor market, borrowing and lending allow
workers to achieve a great deal of insurance on their own in the absence of
unemployment benets.
Few countries would consider reducing employment protection for older
workers. Yet Euwals et al. (2009) point to a Dutch study which shows
that this could reduce unemployment duration for older workers consider-
ably. Furthermore, the economic case for increasing employment protection
with age/tenure is not strong. Current systems of additional employment
24
protection for older workers are a very imperfect attempt at providing con-
sumption smoothing in light of lower re-employment probabilities for older
workers. But once more e¢ cient instruments such as those suggested above
are put in place, the merit of employment protection rests at best on whether
there is a discrepancy between the private cost of labor as perceived by the
rm and the true social opportunity cost of labor. The greater the former
relative to the latter, the greater the incentives to ine¢ ciently dismiss the
worker. Employment protection is often understood as a tax to correct such
a discrepancy (See for example Blanchard and Tirole (2006)). Above we
have discussed three sources of high wages for older workers. One is specic
human capital accumulation; it increases wages because its return are typ-
ically shared between the worker and the rm, not the because the rms
perceived cost of employing the worker has increased. Another is a collec-
tive bargaining structure which is more binding for older workers. It may
indeed increase the wedge between the private and social opportunity cost of
labor, but then one may equally consider a change in collective bargaining.
Finally, there is the e¤ect of deferred payments. But such payments are not
allocative: In Lazears (1990) model, for example, their timing is determined
by incentive considerations, while the separation decision is determined by a
comparison of the workers productivity and the private opportunity cost of
work. Therefore, in that setting, greater wages for the elderly per se do not
generate excesssive incentives for dismissals relative to other workers. Hence
there is no compelling reason to argue for additional employment protection
for older workers.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we solve for the value of the rm under a constant p:
We already know that in the low productivity state, the value of the job to
the rm is equal to
JL(s) =
yL   w
r
(1  e r(T s))
for s > ~s; and to JL(s) =  F (s) for s < ~s; with F (s) = F0 if s < s and
F (s) = F1 if s > s: Let us focus on the regime where ~s > s: We then have
that
F1 =
w   yL
r
(1  e r(T ~s)): (3)
Consider now JH(s); the value of employing a worker of age s in the high
productivity state. The Bellman equation for s > ~s is
(r + p)JH(s) = yH   w + pyL   w
r
(1  e r(T s)) + dJH(s)
ds
: (4)
The solution of this di¤erential equation, whose terminal condition is
JH(T ) = 0; is
JH(s) =
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T s)+ yL   w
r
(1  e r(T s)): (5)
The last term is simply JL(s); the rst term is the expected present dis-
counted value of the additional prots made relative to the low productivity
state as long as the worker remains in a high productivity one. Note also
that this equation along with (3) implies that
JH(~s) =
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T ~s)  F1: (6)
For s < s < ~s; the Bellman equation is
(r + p)JH(s) = yH   w   pF1 + dJH(s)
ds
:
The terminal solution of this di¤erential equation is given by (6). Conse-
quently, the solution is
JH(s) =
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T s)+ yL   w
r + p
(1  e r(T s)e p(~s s))  pF1
r + p
:
(7)
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Consider the decision to re a highly productive worker just before age
s:This will be optimal provided JH(s) <  F0: This is more likely to hold,
the lower F0 and the greater F1: The smallest possible value of F0 is zero,
and the largest one compatible with this regime is the one such that ~s = s;
i.e. F1 =
w yL
r
(1   e r(T s)): Substituting into (7), we see that in such a
case the inequality JH(s) <  F0 = 0 holds provided
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T s) < w   yL
r
(1  e r(T s)):
The maximum admissible value of w is w = yH ; and it can be checked
that at this point this inequality holds, since for any a > 0 the expression
1 e az
z
falls with z:
Finally, for s < s the Bellman equation is
(r + p)JH(s) = yH   w   pF0 + dJH(s)
ds
; (8)
and the terminal condition is a value-matching condition with (7) at s = s:
We get the following solution:
JH(s) =
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T s)+ yL   w
r + p
(1  e r(T s)e p(~s s))
  pF0
r + p
  p(F1   F0)
r + p
e (r+p)(s
 s) (9)
Equations (5), (7) and (9) dene the age-prole of the rms net expected
prots from employing a worker in the high productivity state. If JH(s) > H;
then any worker of age s would be hired. If that inequality fails, then the
worker would not be hired. These formulas are valid in the parameter zone
where ~s > s; or equivalently F1 <
w yL
r
(1  e r(T s)):
Di¤erentiating the relevant formula for JH(:) in the three zones, we get
the following:
1. If s > ~s; we have that J 0H(s) _ (w   yL)  (yH   yL)e p(T s):
2. If s < s < ~s; then J 0H(s) _ (w   yL)  (yH   yL)e p(T ~s):
3. Finally, if s < s; then J 0H(s) _ (w   yL)   (yH   yL)e p(T ~s)  
er(T s
)ep(~s s
)p(F1   F0)
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Consequently, if (w   yL) < (yH   yL)e p(T ~s); or equivalently
w   yL < (yH   yL)

1  rF1
w   yL
p=r
then J 0H < 0 throughout.
If this inequality does not hold, then there are two possibilities:
-If (w  yL)  (yH   yL)e p(T ~s) > er(T s)ep(~s s)p(F1 F0); then H 0 > 0
for s < s^ = T + 1
p
ln w yL
yH yL and H
0 > 0 for s > s^:
-If (w  yL)  (yH   yL)e p(T ~s) < er(T s)ep(~s s)p(F1 F0); then H 0 < 0
for s < s; H 0 > 0 for s < s < s^; and H 0 > 0 for s > s^:
For the sake of completeness, let us also describe the solution if F1 >
w yL
r
(1  e r(T s)): In this case, workers such that s > s are not red when
falling into the low productivity state, and we have two further possibilities:
A. If F0 <
w yL
r
(1 e r(T s)); then all workers such that s < s lose their
job when their productivity falls. Then JH is given by (5) for all s > s: For
s < s; it follows the Bellman equation (8) with the terminal condition
JH(s
) =
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T s)+ yL   w
r
(1  e r(T s)):
The solution is
JH(s) =
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T s)  pF0
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(s s)
+
yL   w
r
(
r
r + p
+
p
r + p
e (r+p)(s
 s)   e r(T s)e p(s s)):
B. If F0 >
w yL
r
(1   e r(T s)); then workers who fall into the low state
are retained i¤ s > ~s; with ~s now solution to
F0 =
w   yL
r
(1  e r(T ~s)); (10)
and ~s < s: For all s > ~s; JH(s) satises the Bellman equation (4) with the
terminal condition JH(T ) = 0: Hence it is again given by (5). For all s < ~s;
it satises (8) with terminal condition
JH(~s) =
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T ~s)  F0:
30
The solution is
JH(s) =
yH   yL
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(T s)  F0
r + p
 
p+ re (r+p)(~s s)

+
yL   w
r + p
 
1  e (r+p)(~s s) :
31
Figure 1: the evolution of skills over the life cyle; source: Avolio and Waldman (1994)
Figure 2: employment of older workers across countries. Source: Hairault et al. (2008)
syL
Figure 3: the firing frontier
s*
syL
Figure 4: effect of tighter employment protection
s* s~




Figure 9: E->U transitions
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Figure 10: E-->non E transition
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Figure 11: job finding rate
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
21 to 25 25 to 30 31 to 35 36 to 40 41 to 45 46 to 50 51 to 55 56 to 60 61 to 65
France
United States
Figure 12: median wage, France, men
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Figure 13: median wage, USA, men
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Education 
level 
High school 
dropout 
High school Some college College degree 
Country France USA France USA France USA France USA 
56-60 47.9 
(1.5) 
53.9 
(2.3) 
58.2 
(3.6) 
69.7 
(1.5) 
55.4 
(4.6) 
73.9 
(1.5) 
79.9 
(3.4) 
83.6 
(1.1) 
61-65 8.6 
(1.1) 
35.4 
(2.2) 
16.0 
(3.6) 
44.9 
(1.7) 
17.3 
(4.5) 
53.1 
(22) 
31.9 
(5.1) 
63.5 
(1.8) 
 
Table 1 – Employment rates of older workers by educational levels, men, US and France. 
 
Education 
level 
High school 
dropout 
High school Some college College degree 
Country France USA France USA France USA France USA 
31-35 11.6 
(1.1) 
7.8 
(1.1) 
6.0 
(1.4) 
6.0 
(0.6) 
6.2 
(1.4) 
3.9 
(0.6) 
5.6 
(1.6) 
2.4 
(0.4) 
36-40 7.3 
(0.8) 
7.2 
(1.0) 
5.5 
(1.5) 
5.3 
(0.6) 
3.7 
(1.2) 
3.7 
(0.6) 
5.6 
(1.6) 
1.5 
(0.3) 
41-45 5.9 
(0.7) 
4.6 
(0.8) 
8.1 
(2.0) 
5.2 
(0.5) 
3.0 
(1.2) 
3.7 
(0.6) 
8.3 
(2.3) 
2.2 
(0.4) 
46-50 6.2 
(0.7) 
5.0 
(0.8) 
8.2 
(2.2) 
3.9 
(0.5) 
7.6 
(2.3) 
3.6 
(0.6) 
5.9 
(1.9) 
2.5 
(0.6) 
51-55 6.3 
(0.7) 
4.5 
(0.9) 
7.7 
(2.0) 
4.7 
(0.6) 
9.5 
(2.9) 
2.5 
(0.4) 
4.3 
(1.8) 
2.2 
(0.4) 
56-60 3.4 
(0.6) 
4.4 
(0.9) 
4.2 
(1.4) 
3.5 
(0.5) 
8.8 
(2.9) 
2.9 
(0.6) 
5.2 
(2.0) 
2.5 
(0.5) 
 
Table 2 – Unemployment rates, men, France and USA 
 
 France USA 
16-30 -0.041 
(0.015) 
-0.063 
(0.016) 
31-40 -0.128 
(0.021) 
-0.215 
(0.021) 
41-50 -0.199 
(0.026) 
-0.369 
(0.022) 
51-65 -0.201 
(0.039) 
-0.225 
(0.03) 
 
Table 3 – Wage losses of displaced workers, men and women, France and USA. 
